Falls from height remain the largest single cause of fatal injury to workers in Great Britain, which is why an inspector who sees work at height reads that RAMS harder than anything else on site — and why a prohibition notice, which stops the activity immediately, is a live possibility rather than a distant one.
The gaps that produce those notices are not obscure. Eight of them account for most of what gets found, and every one is visible on the page before anybody climbs anything.
1. PPE as the primary control
In the document: the control for "fall from height" reads "operatives to wear full body harness with twin lanyard, clipped at all times".
Why it happens: harnesses are concrete, purchasable and easy to write. Designing the fall out of the job is harder and involves somebody else's budget.
What belongs there: regulation 6 of the Work at Height Regulations 2005 sets a sequence — avoid the work at height, then prevent a fall with collective measures, then minimise the distance and consequences. The control must show that sequence being worked through: what was assembled at ground level, what edge protection or platform prevents the fall, and only then what arrests one. A harness as the first answer means four levels were skipped, and it is a critical finding in any structured review.
2. No rescue plan for fall arrest
In the document: fall arrest equipment specified, and the emergency section says "in the event of a fall, call the emergency services".
Why it happens: rescue planning requires equipment, training and a named person, all of which cost money and none of which is needed if nobody falls.
What belongs there: regulation 4 requires work at height to be planned, and that includes planning for emergencies and rescue. A suspended casualty is time-critical — suspension in a harness restricts venous return and a conscious casualty can deteriorate within minutes, which is faster than an ambulance. The plan needs the rescue method, the equipment and where it is kept on site, who is trained, how the alarm is raised, and how the casualty is monitored afterwards. "Call 999" is not a plan; it is the absence of one.
3. A generic muster point
In the document: "assemble at the designated muster point as per site rules".
Why it happens: the section is copied and nobody has needed it. On a roof job it is worse than elsewhere, because the person who needs it may be on a roof with a restricted route down.
What belongs there: the actual location, matching the current site plan, plus the route from the work area — including how somebody at height gets to it, and who accounts for people still on the roof. Generic versus site-specific RAMS covers how quickly a reviewer spots this one.
4. No CISRS reference for scaffold work
In the document: "scaffold to be erected by competent persons".
Why it happens: competence is asserted rather than evidenced, and the author is often not the scaffolder.
What belongs there: the CISRS card level appropriate to the scaffold being erected, with card numbers and expiry dates, plus who supervises. If the scaffold is a TG20-compliant basic configuration say so; if it is outside TG20 it needs a bespoke design, and the RAMS should name the designer and reference the design. Alterations by anyone else — including your own operatives moving a tie — need to be prohibited explicitly, because unauthorised alteration is a recurring cause of collapse.
5. No anchor point rating
In the document: "operatives to clip on to a suitable anchor point".
Why it happens: "suitable" moves the decision to the person on the roof at the time, who is the least equipped to make it and the most under pressure.
What belongs there: what the anchor is, where it is, what it is rated to, and who verified it. Fall arrest generates forces well beyond body weight, so a handrail, a pipe or a purlin is not an anchor because it is convenient. Where a permanent eyebolt or mansafe system exists, reference its identification and its last inspection; anchor devices are subject to periodic examination and the record should be available on site.
6. Edge protection with no specification
In the document: "edge protection to be installed to all open edges".
Why it happens: it reads as complete. Nobody notices that it does not say what the edge protection is.
What belongs there: the system — free-standing counterweighted, clamped, scaffold-integrated — its guardrail heights and the presence of an intermediate rail and toe board, who installs it, who inspects it before use, and when it can be removed. A supervisor cannot verify "edge protection to be installed"; they can verify a double guardrail with toe boards along the north verge.
7. Fragile surfaces unmentioned
In the document: roof work described with no reference to what the roof is made of.
Why it happens: the author has not been on the roof, and a survey exists but was never read.
What belongs there: regulation 9 imposes specific duties around fragile surfaces. Most rooflights are fragile, as are many older fibre cement and liner panels, and they kill people every year. The document should say what the survey found, where the fragile elements are, what platforms, coverings or guardrails are used, and what warning signage goes up. "Assume all rooflights are fragile until confirmed otherwise" is an acceptable position; silence is not.
8. Emergency procedures pointing at the wrong site
In the document: a named first aider who left the company, an A&E that is forty miles away because it was correct on the last job, a rescue kit "located in the site cabin" on a site with no cabin.
Why it happens: section 10 is written once and travels between projects untouched, because nothing tests it until the day it is needed.
What belongs there: names and locations that are true today. The first aider on this shift, the kit and defibrillator locations, the nearest A&E by name and address with the route known, and the rescue equipment on this site. Where a document has been through revisions, this is the section most likely to have been left behind — how often a RAMS should be reviewed lists the triggers that should have caught it.
Reading your own document for these eight
Print it and go through in this order: is avoidance addressed before prevention, and prevention before arrest? Is there a rescue plan with a named person and equipment on site? Are the anchor and the edge protection specified rather than described? Does the document mention the roof's construction? Do the names and places in section 10 exist here today?
Five of the eight are mechanical enough to be checked automatically — PPE as the sole control, blank or generic control language, missing competency references, contradictions between sections — and those come back at the top of a structured review. What critical means in a report explains the ranking. The other three, particularly whether the rescue plan would actually work on this structure, need somebody who has stood on the ground and looked up at it. What a work at height RAMS must include covers the full section-by-section requirement.
This article is general guidance on UK construction documentation practice. It is not legal advice, a compliance certification or a substitute for review by your own qualified health and safety personnel, who remain responsible for deciding whether any particular document is adequate. See our disclaimer.